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Abstract: Disaster-vulnerability reduction is an impure public good: when provided to
one it is provided to others, but not equally provided to all. This means that in addition
to the question of how much disaster-vulnerability reduction to provide, policy makers
face the question of to whom it should be provided. This essay distinguishes between two
broad classes of approaches to the latter question, one based on wealth, the other on
rights.
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‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.’
- United States Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776
‘Every person shall have the right to an environment which is not detrimental to
his or her health or well-being.’
- Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, April 27, 1994

Introduction

Two centuries of history separate the United States Declaration of Independence from the
post-apartheid Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, but both documents share
the fundamental principle that each person has an equal right to life. This remains a
revolutionary idea even today, as we enter the 21st century.
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Bold words do not translate instantly into facts on the ground. More than eight decades
elapsed after the Declaration of Independence before the abolition of slavery in the
United States. But declarations of principle can define a society’s goals, setting a
standard by which to judge their subsequent accomplishments.

The idea that every person is endowed with equal rights to life, liberty, the pursuit of
happiness, and to a safe and healthy environment, is a universalistic ethical precept. To
be sure, it is not universally accepted, let alone universally honored. But this principle
has won increasingly widespread acceptance throughout the world, and is today formally
incorporated in the constitutions of governments which span the globe (for examples, see
the accompanying box).

[INSERT BOX]

We find a similar trend towards the assertion of an egalitarian right to a safe environment
in judicial interpretations of constitutional guarantees. The Supreme Court of India
declared in 1991, for example, that the ‘right to life’ guaranteed in the Indian Constitution
‘includes the right to enjoyment of pollution-free water and air for full enjoyment of
life’.1 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Pakistan has ruled that that country’s
constitutional right to life includes the right to a clean environment; applying this
principle, the Pakistani high court ruled that the dumping of nuclear waste in coastal
areas of Pakistan would violate the right to life (Popovic, 1996, notes 116 and 117).2
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Public Bads and Public Goods

Vulnerability to natural and technological disasters is to a large extent a public bad: such
disasters typically strike communities, not isolated individuals. By the same token,
measures to reduce vulnerability are to a large extent public goods.

Disaster-vulnerability reduction is seldom a pure public good, however, in the strict sense
of a good which when provided to one is provided to all (non-excludability), and whose
consumption by one does not diminish its availability to others (non-rivalness). The 20th
century textbook case of a pure public good was national defense; the 21st century
textbook case may be policies to combat global warming.

Many measures to reduce disaster vulnerability are impure public goods, which when
provided to one are provided to others, but not equally provided to all. For example,
flood-control projects provide location-specific benefits, restricted to the subset of the
population who live or own assets in the protected area. Similarly, the reinforcement of
public infrastructure against earthquakes primarily benefits its users. Safety measures to
prevent or contain the effects of industrial accidents primarily benefit those who live and
work nearby. By virtue of where they live, work, or own property, some members of
society are excluded from the benefits of these investments.
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Although disaster-vulnerability reduction is not a pure public good, neither is it a pure
private good. ‘To say a thing is not located at the South Pole,’ Paul Samuelson (1955, p.
356) once remarked, ‘does not logically place it at the North Pole.’ Measures to reduce
disaster vulnerability often lie in intermediate terrain between the two (see Figure 1).
Some measures, such as cyclone early-warning systems, are near the public end of the
spectrum (although some - those with radios, for example – are better able to access this
information than others). Others, such as the retrofitting of individual homes in seismic
zones, are near the private end of the spectrum. Many are somewhere in between.

[INSERT FIGURE 1]

This means that in addition to the public policy question of how much disastervulnerability reduction to provide, we must face the question of to whom it should be
provided. We face not only the classic economic problem of the allocation of scarce
resources among competing ends, but also the classic political-economy problem of the
allocation of scarce resources among competing individuals, groups, and classes.

Here I focus on the latter issue. The ‘to whom’ question is relevant to two key arenas of
public policies for risk reduction: first, the allocation of public-sector investment; and
second, the creation of an appropriate incentive structure for private-sector investments.
In formulating policies in both arenas, two broad classes of approaches to the interpersonal allocation question can be distinguished. For shorthand, I will term them the
wealth-based approach and the rights-based approach.
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The Wealth-based Approach

The wealth-based approach is so widespread among economists that I might be tempted
to call it ‘the economic approach’, but for the fact that there are some economists, myself
included, who are not enamoured of it. This approach is founded on willingness to pay,
which is conditioned, as always, by ability to pay.

In brief, the wealth-based approach holds that the inter-personal allocation of disastervulnerability reduction should be guided by willingness to pay for those reductions: those
individuals who are willing (and, perforce, able) to pay more, deserve to get more.
Putting aside inter-personal differences in preferences, including differences in risk
aversion, this willingness-to-pay criterion is strongly correlated with wealth. Richer
individuals, groups, and classes will get more of the impure public good of disastervulnerability reduction than their poorer counterparts.

Whatever its prescriptive appeal, this principle serves rather well as a first approximation
of what often happens in practice: it has considerable descriptive relevance.

For

example, the casualties from the 1976 earthquake in Guatemala were so unevenly
distributed across the population – with most of the 22,000 deaths among the poor – that
the disaster was dubbed a ‘classquake’ (Blaikie et al., 1994, pp. 170-171).

The

earthquake’s disproportionate impact on the poor was due both to the location of their
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homes in landslide-susceptible ravines and gorges, and to their inability to afford
earthquake-resistant construction.

Similarly, IFRC Secretary General Didier Cherpitel reminds us that malaria today kills
more than one million people each year – the equivalent of a Guatemalan earthquake
every eight days – most of them in sub-Saharan Africa. The medical technology to avert
many, if not all, of these deaths exists, but it is not effective because ‘there is no market
in malaria and little buying power in Africa’ (Cherpitel, 2000).

The wealth-based approach is not confined to the realm of ‘what is’. It also exerts a
powerful influence, implicitly or explicitly, on many policymakers’ notions of ‘what
ought to be’. One famous (or infamous) example is the memorandum written by then
World Bank chief economist Lawrence Summers in 1992, in which he posed the
question, ‘Just between you and me, shouldn’t the World Bank be encouraging more
migration of the dirty industries to the LDCs [less developed countries]?’ One reason for
such a policy, Summers wrote, was that:

The measurement of the costs of health-impairing pollution depends on the
forgone earnings from increased morbidity and mortality. From this point of
view a given amount of health-impairing pollution should be done in the country
with the lowest cost, which will be the country with the lowest wages. I think the
economic logic of dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest-wage country is
impeccable and we should face up to that.3
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Summers’ memorandum was noteworthy not so much for the view expressed, but for the
fact that it was expressed overtly. One virtue of tactlessness is that it spotlights matters
which polite society prefers to leave unmentioned.

Inter-personal Weights in the Measurement of Social Welfare

Lest we cede the ‘economic’ terrain to this particular view, we should recall that other
economists have advanced alternative notions of social welfare – and hence of
development and efficiency – including several economists who, like Summers, have
held prominent positions at the World Bank. A quarter century ago, for example, in the
landmark volume Redistribution with Growth, Montek Ahluwalia and Hollis Chenery
defined the growth of social welfare as a weighted sum of the change in welfare of
different subsets of the population:

G = w1g1 + w2g2 + … + wngn

where G = index of growth of total social welfare;

gi = income growth rate of the ith group (e.g., quintiles ranked from poorest to
richest);
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and

wi = welfare weight assigned to the ith group (!wi = 1).

The authors then distinguished three alternative measures. The first equates the weights,
w i , to each group’s share in national income. In a ‘typical’ developing country, for
example, Ahluwalia and Chenery noted that the weight of the poorest quintile would be
0.05, while that of the richest quintile would be 0.53. In other words, the change in
welfare of the richest quintile ‘counts’ more than ten times more than that of the poorest,
reflecting their respective income shares. The resulting index of social welfare is, of
course, GNP growth, the conventional measure of economic performance.

Ahluwalia and Chenery’s second measure, based on ‘equal weights’, counts a 1% gain in
income the same whether it is experienced by the poor or the rich. That is, instead of
treating each dollar equally, as in the GNP-weights scheme, the equal-weights scheme
treats each person (or income class) equally: w1 = w2 = … = wn for all i groups.

The third measure is based on ‘poverty weights.’ These are the opposite of the GNP
weighting scheme, in that they put greater weight on gains to the poor than on gains to
the rich: w1 > w2 > … > wn . To illustrate, Ahluwalia and Chenery (1974, p. 51) suggest
poverty weights of 0.6 on the income change of the poorest 40% of the population, and
0.1 on that of the richest 20%.4

Applying these alternatives social welfare measures to disaster-risk mitigation (instead of
to income), we could put equal weight on risk-reductions to all individuals, regardless of
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their income or wealth. Or we could put greater weight on risk reductions for the poorest
strata of the population, those who are currently at greatest risk.

The Rights-based Approach

This brings us back to the rights-based approach. This approach is founded not on the
inegalitarian distribution of wealth within and among countries (translated, via real-world
markets or the shadow markets of benefit-cost analysis, into willingness to pay), but
rather on the egalitarian distribution of the right to a clean and safe environment.

In the allocation of public-sector investments for disaster-risk mitigation, a rights-based
approach would assign equal weight to mortality and morbidity impacts across the
population, regardless of an individual’s wealth or social status. Extending this approach
to inter-generational allocation would imply that future lives and health should not be
discounted, but rather valued equally with present lives and health.

In shaping private-sector incentives via the legal and regulatory structure, a rights-based
approach would define liability on the same basis, with the right to a safe environment
held equally by all. Infringements of this right would constitute legal grounds for claims
for restitution. Private firms would seek to insure against such claims, opening an avenue
for the insurance sector to play a role in the enforcement of safety standards: the more
unsafe the facility, the higher the price of insurance. In the case of industrial disasters, at
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least, this would allow the insurance sector to play a constructive role even when the
individuals whose safety is at risk are too poor to buy insurance, for it would be the
responsibility of those whose actions jeopardize their safety to insure against any risks to
lives and health.

As one who sympathizes with the rights-based approach, I am encouraged by the signs of
its growing embrace by peoples and governments around the world. But I want to
conclude by noting three tensions which efforts to apply this approach must confront.

First is the problem posed by non-uniform spatial distribution of human populations.
There is a difference between saying that each individual has an equal right to risk
mitigation and saying that the weight on each individual’s risk should be equal. In the
latter case, risks in more densely populated areas carry greater weight than the same risks
in less densely populated areas, simply because there are more people to add up. Even
the most ardent proponents of the former principle – which aims for equality of risk
regardless of where people happen to live – probably would not advocate putting a highlevel nuclear waste storage facility in New York City, even if Manhattan island had the
same geological properties as Nevada’s Yucca Mountain. But the ethical argument that
people should not suffer greater disaster risks simply by virtue of living outside great
population centers cannot be dismissed lightly.

Second is the problem posed by private risk mitigation. As an impure public good,
disaster-risk mitigation has some components which can be privately purchased, the
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distribution of which is founded on ability and willingness to pay – for example, living in
more earthquake-resistant homes. This fact provides compelling grounds for public
policies which put priority on risk mitigation for those who are less able to obtain it
privately – a disaster-vulnerability application of Ahluwalia and Chenery’s poverty
weights.

Finally, we must face the tensions between an egalitarian allocation of the right to life
(and hence to disaster-vulnerability reduction) and the inegalitarian allocation of
economic wealth and political power. Lawrence Summers alluded to this problem in his
memorandum:

The problem with the arguments against all of these proposals for more pollution
in LDCs (intrinsic rights to certain goods, moral reasons, social concerns, lack of
adequate markets, etc.) could be turned around and used more or less effectively
against every Bank proposal for liberalization.

This is, perhaps, an exaggeration. Wealth-based and rights-based approaches to interpersonal allocations have long co-existed, and tensions between them will remain a
feature of modern societies for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the sphere of the
rights-based approach has gradually widened over time. The abolition of slavery is one
example; the extension of the right to vote to all adult citizens, instead of its restriction on
the basis of property ownership, race, or gender, is another; the advent and spread of free
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public education is a third. The rights-based approach to disaster vulnerability represents
a further step on this road.

The radically egalitarian principles proclaimed in the US Declaration of Independence
and the South African constitution were, and remain today, actively contested. Yet these
principles are on the ascendancy worldwide. As my late countryman, Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., once remarked, ‘The moral arc of history is long, but it bends toward justice.’

There is no magic recipe for pursuing a rights-based approach to disaster-vulnerability
reduction in the face of the predictable opposition from vested interests who favor a
wealth-based approach. But those who accept the challenges of moving in this direction
can take heart from the belief that history is on their side.
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Notes
Subash Kumar v. State of Bihar, 1991 A.I.R. 420, 424 (India Sup. Ct. 1991), cited by
Popovic (1996, note 118). For discussion, see also Anderson (1996).
1

2

For discussion, see also Lau (1996).

3

This statement appears in an excerpt from the memorandum published in The
Economist (1992) under the title ‘Let them eat pollution.’
4

Benefit-cost analysis similarly can incorporate distributional weights which value
dollars differently depending on to whom they accrue. For discussions, see Little and
Mirrlees (1974, pp. 234-242) and Ray (1984, pp. 22-31).
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Box: Examples of Constitutional Rights to the Environment
‘All residents enjoy the right to a healthy, balanced environment.’
- Argentina Constitution, art. 41
‘Every person shall have the right to a wholesome environment.’
- Belarus Constitution, art. 46
‘Every person has the right to a healthy, satisfying and lasting environment.’
- Benin Constitution, art. 27
‘Citizens have the right to a healthy and favorable environment.’
- Bulgaria Constitution, art. 55
‘The right to a healthy environment shall be recognized.’
- Burkina Faso Constitution, art. 31
‘The Constitution guarantees to all persons: . . . The right to live in an environment free from
contamination.’
- Chile Constitution (1980), Ch. III, art. 19(8)
‘Every individual has the right to enjoy a healthy environment.’
- Colombia Constitution, art. 79
‘All persons have the right to a clean and healthy environment.’
- Ethiopia Constitution, art. 44(1)
‘All citizens shall have the right to a healthy and pleasant environment.’
- Korea Constitution, Ch. II, art. 35 (1987)
‘Citizens of the Kyrghyz Republic shall have the right to a healthy safe environment.’
- Kyrghyz Constitution, art. 35
‘Every human being has the right to live an environment that is ecologically safe for life and
health.’
- Moldova Constitution, art. 37
‘Everyone shall have the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced human environment and the
duty to defend it.’
- Portugal Constitution, pt. I, 1 III, ch. II, art. 66(1) (1982)
‘Everyone has the right to live in a healthy, balanced environment.’
- Turkey Constitution, ch. VIII(A), art. 56 (1982)
Source: Neil A. F. Popovic, ‘In Pursuit of Environmental Human Rights: Commentary on the Draft Declaration of
Principles on Human Rights and the Environment,’ Columbia Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 27, Spring 1996.
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Figure 1: Disaster Vulnerability as an Impure Public Bad
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